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Abstract
This paper studies a VaR-regulated optimal portfolio problem of the equity
holder of a participating life insurance contract. In a complete market setting
the optimal solution is given explicitly for contracts with mortality risk using
a martingale approach for constrained non-concave optimization problems. We
show that regulatory VaR constraints for participating insurance contracts lead
to more prudent investment than in the case of no regulation. This result is con-
trary to the situation where the insurer maximizes the utility of the total wealth
of the company (without distinguishing between contributions of equity holders
and policyholders), in which case a VaR constraint may induce the insurer to take
excessive risks leading to higher losses than in the case of no regulation, see [3].
Furthermore, importantly for regulators we observe that for participating insur-
ance contracts both relatively small or relatively large policyholder contributions
yield rather risky and volatile strategies. Finally, we also discuss the regulatory ef-
fect of a portfolio insurance (PI), and analyze different choices for the parameters
of the participating contract numerically.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the equity holder’s optimal investment problem of a participating
contract under financial regulation. This problem is particularly relevant for insurance
companies that operate under Solvency II with a Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint. Par-
ticipating contracts are life insurance products which provide the policyholder at least
a guaranteed amount in downside market situations and a shared profit in good market
scenarios. To participate in the contract, the policyholder pays a premium (partici-
pation fee) which is collected together with the (equity holder) insurer’s participation
amount in an investment pool. At maturity, the policyholder receives a payoff which is
linked to the investment performance. The equity holder’s payoff is determined as the
residual amount.
Earlier studies on equity-linked life insurance contracts usually analyze pricing or
optimal design problems. Some focus on the policyholder’s perspective assuming specific
investment strategies like constant proportion portfolio insurance (CPPI) or generalized
constant-mix (see, e.g., [9, 30, 31, 34]). Recently, [14] has incorporated taxes and a so-
called fair pricing constraint in the policyholder’s problem.
In this paper, we consider two common contract designs. In the first design we
assume that the policyholder is fully protected against an insolvency of the insurance
company (i.e., the final payoff to the policyholder always exceeds or equals the guaran-
teed amount). In the second design, we assume that the equity holder has only limited
liability, i.e., the policyholder’s payoff is less than the guaranteed amount in case of a
default of the insurance company. Note that in the case of full protection, the equity
holder may suffer a negative payoff in case of insolvency. To describe the behavior of
the equity holder in the loss domain, we use an S-shaped utility function adopted from
prospect theory [37, 25, 29].
Risk management and regulations based on a terminal VaR constraint are well-
known in banking and insurance regulations. Recall that VaR, defined as an estimate
of the maximum portfolio loss given a pre-set significance level, is a quantile measure
that controls the tail risk of the terminal portfolio. The problem of utility maximiza-
tion/optimal asset allocation under VaR-type constraints has been studied extensively
in the literature, see e.g. [3, 8, 16, 18, 15].
This paper solves the equity holder’s problem of utility maximization under a regula-
tory constraint imposed at maturity. We obtain closed-form solutions for various kinds
of constraints. We first explicitly solve the problem for the two kinds of contracts men-
tioned above under a VaR regulation using the martingale approach for non-concave
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utility maximization problems with constraints. Second, motivated by the fact that
regulators usually affect insurance contract designs by imposing a minimum capital re-
quirement which is used to control adverse events, we also introduce a floor on the min-
imum guarantee rate. This portfolio insurance (PI) constraint enhances the protection
for the policyholder especially when a defaultable put is included in the policyholder’s
payoff.
Our theoretical and numerical results show that already in the case of no regulation
there is a moral hazard problem since the insurer does not have an incentive to ensure
that there is any capital in the loss states where the terminal wealth falls below the
minimal guarantee. The reason is that any terminal wealth in those loss states only
benefits the policyholder and comes at the expense of a lower terminal wealth in the
more prosperous states where the equity holder receives a positive residual. On the
other hand, introducing a VaR constraint as in Solvency 2 forces the equity holders
to enlarge the proportion of hedged loss states, leading to a genuine improvement for
the policyholders. This result is contrary to the situation where the insurer maximizes
the utility of the total wealth of the company without distinguishing between equity
holders and policyholders, in which case a VaR constraint may induce the insurer to
take excessive risk leading to higher losses than in the case of no regulation, see [3].
This more prudent investment behavior described above is more pronounced if a VaR-
based regulation is replaced by a PI-based regulation. Furthermore, the introduction of
a full protection makes the equity holder’s investment also generally more prudent in
bad market scenarios.
Our derivation of the optimal solutions relies on the combination of a martingale
approach for non-concave and non-differentiable objective functions and a point-wise
optimization technique with constraints. Note that the classical martingale method can
not be directly applied for the equity’s problem as the derived utility function is neither
concave nor differentiable. The problem of non-concave utility maximization without
constraints has been considered by many authors e.g., [13, 36, 20, 12, 35, 7, 28, 4],
using a concavification technique. In a more general framework without constraints,
[35] proves the existence of an optimal terminal wealth. However, no specific payoff is
provided.
When finishing this paper we noticed that [29] has independently investigated a
similar problem for power utility function without regulations. Note that for a piece-
wise payoff structure, it is very challenging to deal with a VaR constraint because the
bindingness should be included in the choice of the corresponding multiplier. Hence,
the VaR-constrained problem is more complicated to solve. In this paper, we consider
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a more general utility function with (independent) mortality risk. To deal with the
constrained non concave problems, we extend the technique developed in [15].
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the asset model and the
parametric family of contract payoffs. We then solve the unregulated problems without
mortality in Section 3 in connection with the concavification technique. Section 4 dis-
cusses the case with independent mortality. In Section 5, we investigate the constrained
problems. The results are numerically illustrated in Section 6. All technical proofs are
reported in the Appendix.
2 The financial market and participating contracts
2.1 The financial market
Consider a complete financial market in continuous time without transaction costs that
contains one traded risky asset and one risk free asset (the bank account). Let the asset
price dynamics for the risky asset S and the bank account B be given by
dSt = µtStdt+ σtStdWt, S0 > 0; dBt = rtBtdt, B0 = 1, (2.1)
where Wt is a standard Brownian motion on the probability space (Ω,F ,P). We assume
that rt ≥ 0 and that µt and σt > 0 are deterministic and bounded processes. This
implies that the stochastic differential equations for S and B have unique solution on
[0, T ]. Denote by {Ft}t∈[0,T ] the filtration generated by the Brownian motion. For the
moment, ignoring the insurance risk, we are in a complete market setting which implies
the existence of a unique state price density
dξt = −ξt(rtdt+ θtdWt), ξ0 = 1, (2.2)
where θt := σ
−1
t (µt − rt) is the market price of risk process. Here ξt(ω) is the Arrow-
Debreu value per probability (or likelihood) unit of a security which pays out $1 at time
t if the scenario ω happens, and 0 else. As this value is high in a recession and low in
prosperous times, ξt(ω) has the nice property of directly reflecting the overall state of
the economy. Therefore, the functional relationship between the optimal wealth and ξt
may be used as an interpretation of some of our results. This approached was also used
in [33, 3, 8, 18, 15, 2, 23, 24, 21]. See also [17] for an elaborate explanation. We remark
that in a consumption based pricing model ξt in equilibrium corresponds to a constant
times the marginal utility of consumption and is also called pricing kernel or stochastic
discount factor.
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The insurance company chooses an investment strategy that we describe in terms of
the amount pit (in $) invested in the risky asset at time t. We assume that the remaining
fraction of wealth (1−pit) is invested in the risk free asset to guarantee that the strategy
is self-financing. The wealth process related to the strategy pit when starting with an
initial wealth x0 > 0 is then easily seen to satisfy
dXt = (rtXt + pit(µt − rt))dt+ pitσtdWt, X0 > 0. (2.3)
Definition 2.1. A strategy (pit)t∈[0,T ] is said admissible if it is adapted with respect to
the natural filtration F and E[∫ T
0
pi2t dt] < ∞. Furthermore, Xt (the solution of SDE
(2.3)) exists and Xt ≥ 0 a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ]. The set of all admissible strategies is
denoted by A.
In a complete market, it is known from the martingale method that choosing a
portfolio is equivalent to choosing a terminal wealth XT which can be financed by X0.
The set of admissible terminal wealth values is defined by
X := {X ∈ L1(Ω,FT ,P) : X ≥ 0 and E[ξTX] ≤ X0}.
Hence, the dynamic problem suppi∈AE [U(XT )] is equivalent to the static one
sup
XT∈X
E [U(XT )] ,
where U is some strictly increasing and differentiable concave utility function. This is
the classical Merton problem considered by e.g. [32, 33]. The solution to this problem
is also called the Merton solution. Let us first emphasize that the classical martingale
method can not be directly applied when the utility function is neither concave nor
differentiable. This issue will be addressed further in the sequel.
2.2 Participating contracts and payoffs
We assume that the representative policyholder invests in a single-premium equity-
linked life insurance contract with a maturity of T years with T <∞. At the initiation
of the contract, the policyholder invests a lump sum L0; the shareholder provides an
initial equity E0 > 0. Consequently, the initial portfolio value is given by the sum of
both contributions, i.e., X0 := L0 + E0. We denote by α := L0/X0 the share of the
policyholder’s contribution (or equivalently the debt ratio of our insurance company).
Below α is also called the policyholder’s participation rate. At maturity T and in
case of solvency, the policyholder receives some guaranteed amount LT (we can, for
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example, choose LT = L0 e
gT , where g ∈ R is the guaranteed rate). If the terminal
portfolio value exceeds the guaranteed rate, i.e., if XT > LT , the surplus XT − LT is
shared between insurance company and policyholder. In this paper, we assume that
the policyholder receives a surplus equal to δ
[
αXT −LT
]+1, where the surplus (bonus)
rate δ is the percentage of surpluses that is credited to the policyholder. If the terminal
portfolio value XT is less than the guarantee (default event), the policyholder receives
the remaining amount. To exclude unrealistic cases, we assume throught the paper that
0 < α < 1 and 0 ≤ δ < 1. To summarize, the policyholder receives the following payoff
at time T :
V pL (XT ) :=
XT if XT ≤ LT ,LT + δ [αXT − LT ]+ else ,
=LT + δ
[
αXT − LT
]+ − [LT −XT ]+.
Hence, the policyholder takes a long position in the bonus option and a short position
in a defaultable put and benefits from the potential upsides over the final maturity
guarantee. This type of defaultable contracts is frequently used in the literature on
insurance contracts, see, for example [10, 22, 5]. The equity holder always obtains the
residual asset value
V pE(XT ) := XT − VL(XT ) =

0 if XT ≤ LT ,
XT − LT if LT < XT ≤ L˜T ,
XT − LT − δ
[
αXT − LT
]+
else,
= [XT − LT ]+ − δ
[
αXT − LT
]+
, (2.4)
where we introduced L˜T := LT/α which is the threshold where the participation bonus
kicks in. Agreeing on the contract, the insurer takes a long position of the call [XT−LT ]+
and δα short positions of the bonus call
[
XT − L˜T
]+
with strike price L˜T . For our
analysis, we introduce
δ˜ := αδ; L̂T := L˜T − LT and f(x) = (1− δ˜)x− (1− δ)LT . (2.5)
Hence, δ˜ is the actual (achieved) bonus rate of the policyholder, L̂T is the difference
between the bonus threshold and the guarantee, and f(x) is the payoff that the insurer
receives in case that the wealth x is greater than the bonus threshold L̂T . Like any profit-
seeking company, the life insurance company sets up its investment mix to primarily
1[ · ]+ denotes the maximum max{ · , 0}.
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maximize the benefits of its shareholder. Hereby, we assume that the shareholder values
her benefits through a utility function U defined on the positive real line, which is twice
differentiable and satisfies the usual Inada and the asymptotic elasticity (AE) (see [27])
conditions
lim
x↓0
U ′(x) =∞; lim
x↑∞
U ′(x) = 0; lim
x↑∞
xU ′(x)
U(x)
< 1. (2.6)
We assume furthermore that U(0) = limx→0 U(x) > −∞.2 As usual, we denote by I
the inverse of the first derivative of the utility function U ′. For optimal terminal wealth
representations we introduce
h(x) :=
I
(
x/(1− δ˜)) + (1− δ)LT
1− δ˜ . (2.7)
Note that h is a decreasing mapping from
(
0, (1− δ˜)U ′(L̂T )
]
to [L˜T ,∞).
2.3 Full protection and S-shaped utility function
In this subsection, we consider the case where the contract at maturity gives the policy-
holder at least some guaranteed amount LT (see, among many others, [10, 22]). More
precisely, at time T the policyholder receives the following payoff
V npL (XT ) := LT + δ
[
αXT − LT
]+
,
and the equity holder takes the residual portfolio value
V npE (XT ) := XT − VL(XT ) =
XT − LT if XT ≤ L˜T ,XT − LT − δ [αXT − LT ]+ if XT > L˜T .
In this full protection case, the insurer takes more risk because she may have a neg-
ative payoff in the insolvency case where XT − LT < 0. Taking potential losses for
the insolvency case into account we assume that the insurer evaluates the investment
optimality using an S-shaped utility (convex on the loss domain and concave on the
gain domain) suggested by prospect theory [37] . In particular, the insurance company’s
utility function takes the following form
US(x) :=
−Ulo(−x) if x < 0,U(x) if x ≥ 0,
2The case where U(0) = limx→0 U(x) = −∞ is easier and can be treated without concavification
procedure, see more in Remark 3.
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where Ulo and U are two utility functions. We assume furthermore that U satisfies the
Inada and (AE) conditions. For example, we can take Ulo(x) = ηU(−x), for some loss
aversion degree η > 1, see [37]. Note that for such fully protected contracts, the guarantee
level LT is considered as the reference point which is naturally used to distinguish gains
and losses.
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Figure 1: Payoffs with α = 0.8, δ = 0.9, LT = 50e0.02×10
2.4 Contracts with mortality risk
Mortality is one of the most important risk factors in life insurance as it strongly affects
the pricing and premium principles. Note that when non-tradable stochastic mortal-
ity is considered, the market becomes incomplete. For detailed discussion on general
stochastic mortality models and their applications we refer for instance to [19, 11]. In
this section we incorporate mortality risk into the optimal investment problem of the
equity holder. For simplicity, we assume that the premature death of the policyholder
is modelled by the event {d = 1}, where d is a binomial random variable which is in-
dependent of the financial risk [1, 6] and the reference portfolio value (Xt)t∈[0,T ]. This
assumption allows to employ a separating technique in our optimization problem.
First, consider the case where the policyholder receives full protection. We suppose
that the policyholder receives the amount V npL (XT ) if she is alive at maturity. If she
dies before maturity the guarantee LT will be paid at maturity to the policyholder’s
relative (inheritress). So, the policyholder’s payoff is given by
V np,dL (XT ) := V
np
L (XT )1d=0 + LT1d=1.
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Hence, the equity holder’s payoff will be given by the difference between the terminal
portfolio value and the amount paid to the policyholder, i.e.,
V np,dE (XT ) := XT − V np,dL (XT ) = V npE (XT )1d=0 + (XT − LT )1d=1.
Remark 1. For the sake of simplicity, we have assumed that d is a Bernoulli variable.
This can be generalized to the case where d ∼ Bin(n, p) for some p ∈ (0, 1) and n ∈ N.
Recall that V npL and V
np
E are the payoffs defined in the absence of mortality risk in
Section 2.3.
For the case of a defaultable contract, we still assume that the policyholder receives
the amount V pL (XT ) if she is alive at maturity and in case of death the guarantee LT
will be paid.3 Therefore, the policyholder’s payoff is given by
V p,dL (XT ) := V
p
L (XT )1d=0 + LT1d=1,
and
V p,dE (XT ) := XT − V p,dL (XT ) = V pE(XT )1d=0 + (XT − LT )1d=1.
2.5 Insurer’s optimization objective
The insurer wants to solve the following optimization problem
sup
XT∈X
E
[
U˜S,j,d(XT )
]
, where U˜S,j,d := US ◦ V j,dE , j ∈ {p, np}. (2.8)
We observe that the payoffs V j,dL and V
j,d
E , j ∈ {p, np} admit a path-independent struc-
ture which allows to apply the martingale approach. When mortality is ignored we drop
τ in the superscript and still denote the equity holder’s derived utility function by
U˜S,j := U˜S ◦ V jE, j ∈ {p, np}.
We remark that for the defaultable contract without mortality the use of an S-shaped
utility is not needed, i.e., US ≡ U , and hence U˜S,p ≡ U˜p := U ◦ V pE .
We furthermore assume the following integrability condition:
Assumption (U): For any λ ∈ (0,∞), we have
E[U((1− δ˜)−1I(λξT ))] <∞ and E[ξT I(λξT )] <∞.
3For a defaultable contract, an alternative assumption is that there is no guaranteed payment in
case of premature death. In this situation there is no need to use an S-shaped utility function as the
insurer’s terminal wealth is always non-negative.
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It is straightforward to check that Assumption (U) holds for commonly used utility
functions like power, logarithmic, exponential. This condition is needed to guarantee
the existence of the Lagrangian multiplier λ.
Now, the independence of τ and reference portfolio allows us to write
E
[
U˜S,j,d(XT )
]
= (1−P(d = 1))E
[
U˜S,j(XT )
]
+ P(d = 1)E
[
US(XT − LT )
]
.
Introducing  := P(d = 1), the optimization problem (2.8) can be rewritten as
sup
XT∈X
E
[
U˜S,j,(XT )
]
, (2.9)
where
U˜S,j,(x) := (1− )U˜S,j(x) + US(x− LT ).
Note that 1−  = P(d = 0) is the survival probability 4 and U˜S,j, is an S-shaped utility
function for all  ∈ [0, 1]. In particular,
U˜S,j,(XT ) :=

−jUlo(LT −XT ) if XT ≤ LT ,
U(XT − LT ) if LT < XT ≤ L˜T , j ∈ {p, np},
U(XT ) XT > L˜T ,
(2.10)
where np := 1 and p :=  and U(x) is defined by
U(x) := (1− )U(f(x)) +  U(x− LT ). (2.11)
Hence, U(x) is the utility of the equity holder in case of mortality if x is greater than the
bonus threshold. Furthermore, U(x) is a linear combination of U(f(x)) and U(x−LT ),
weighted by 1−  and  respectively. Clearly, U(x) is a strictly increasing and concave
function on [L˜T ,∞) for all  ∈ [0, 1]. Its first derivative is given by
U ′(x) = (1− )(1− δ˜)U ′(f(x)) + U ′(x− LT ). (2.12)
Moreover, for any x ≥ L˜T we have f(x) ≤ x− LT , which implies that
U(f(x)) ≤ U(x) ≤ U(x− LT ), ∀x ≥ L˜T .
To present the optimal terminal wealth we introduce the inverse marginal utility function
I := [U
′
]
−1. From (2.11) we observe that for all y ≤ ξ
L˜
= U ′

(L˜T ) we have
I
(
y/δ˜) + LT ≥ I(y) ≥ (1− δ˜)−1
[
I
(
y/δ˜)− (1− δ)LT
]
, (2.13)
4If the policyholder’s age is x then 1−  = xpT using the standard actuarial notations.
10
where δ˜ is defined by
δ˜ := (1− δ˜)(1− ) + . (2.14)
Note that for the case without full protection U˜S,p, coincides with U˜S,np, on the gain
domain [LT ,∞). However, when the portfolio value falls below the liability level LT ,
the insurer now partially suffers a smaller loss measured by Ulo(LT −XT ) due to the
presence of the defaultable put. The upper bound of loss is then given by
qp := Ulo(LT ) < qnp := Ulo(LT ). (2.15)
3 Unconstrained problem and concavification
To discuss the solution of the general problem (2.8), we first study the simple case for
the payoff V pL (given in (2.4)) without mortality, namely
sup
XT∈X
E [U(V pE(XT ))] , (3.1)
where U is a utility function satisfying condition (AE) and the integrability assumption
(U). Note that the insurer’s payoff is positive almost surely and hence, the use of an
S-shaped utility function is not needed. Moreover, as mentioned above, the classical
martingale method can not be directly applied for (3.1) because the derived utility
function U˜p := U ◦ V pE is neither concave nor differentiable. Motivated by non-linear
compensation schemes for a fund manager, the maximizing the utility of terminal wealth
for non-concave utility functions has been considered by many authors e.g., [13, 20, 12,
35, 7]. Similar characterisations can be found in [28, 31, 4] where non-linear contract
payoffs or changing preferences are considered. Let us briefly summarize the basic ideas
of the concavification method which relies on convex analysis.
Convex conjugate: Intuitively, the convex conjugate of U˜p can be related to a family
of upper-half hyperplanes whose intersection equals to the region below the graph of
U˜p. In particular, each member of this family is the smallest affine function of the form
xy + c which dominate U˜p, i.e.,
U˜p(x) ≤ xy + c, ∀x ∈ [0,∞).
Then, for a given slope y, the corresponding conjugate of U˜p is the smallest constant c
being determined by
(U˜p)∗(y) := sup
x≥0
(U˜p(x)− xy).
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Note that U˜p is not differentiable at the utility changing points LT and L˜T . Therefore,
it is important to first compute the above supremum on each interval [0, LT ], [LT , L˜T ]
and [L˜T ,∞). The convex conjugate (U˜p)∗(y) follows from a comparison among these
three local maximums. Since U˜p is concave on each of these intervals the corresponding
supremum defines a convex and decreasing function in y. Therefore, (U˜p)∗(y) can be
seen as a decreasing, convex and differentiable function except on a finite number of
points (which are explicitly determined below as the tangency point depending on our
parameters). Classical results from convex analysis ensure that the double conjugate
(U˜p)∗∗ is the smallest concave function which dominates U˜p, and on an interval where
the concavification is needed (U˜p)∗∗ is linear [12, 35]. The optimal terminal wealth is
then given5 by X∗T = −((U˜p)∗)′+(λξT ) for some Lagrangian multiplier determined via
the budget constraint. For more details, see [13, 20, 12, 35, 7].
Remark 2. We will see later in Section 5 that when a VaR constraint is additionally
imposed the optimal solution can not be directly derived from the right derivative of the
convex conjugate (U˜p)∗. As mentioned above, (U˜p)∗∗ may be linear in some interval
which means that the concave hull of the utility function is neither strictly concave nor
smooth, and the results in [3] for concave optimization under a VaR constraint cannot
be applied.
To obtain explicit solutions, below we use the Lagrangian approach to determine
the optimal solution and point out the links to the concavification points of the derived
utility function which is determined below.
3.1 Concavification
In this section, we determine the concavification of the derived utility function U(x)
defined in (2.11). Recall that U(x) is a strictly increasing and concave function on
[L˜T ,∞) for all  ∈ [0, 1] with first derivative U ′(x) given by (2.12). Furthermore, let
q ≥ 0 and define
Υ,q(x) := U(x)− xU ′(x) + q. (3.2)
The parameter q represents the upper bound of the losses in case of an S-shaped utility
function and is used to deal with negative wealth. In particular, we set q = Ulo(LT ) in
the case of full protection and q = Ulo(LT ) in the case where default put and death
probability are considered simultaneously, see Section 4 below.
5f ′+ stands for right derivative of f
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Figure 2: Concave hull for power utility function with  = q = 0
Concavification of the derived utility function crucially depends on the sign of Υ,q
at the utility changing point L˜T . In particular, the concavification area depends on
Υ,q(L˜T ) and Υ
1,q(L˜T ), see the Lemma below. From (3.2) we easily observe that
Υ,q(L˜T ) = U(L̂T )− δ˜U ′(L̂T )L˜T + q ≥ U(L̂T )− U ′(L̂T )L˜T + q = Υ1,q(L˜T ),
where δ˜ is defined by (2.14). The concave hull of the derived utility function is then
characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let  ∈ [0, 1], q ≥ 0 and Υ,q defined as in (3.2). If Υ1,q(L˜T ) > 0 then
there exists a positive number LT < ŷ
1,q < L˜T satisfying Υ
1,q(ŷ1,q) = 0, i.e.,
U(ŷ1,q − LT )− U ′(ŷ1,q − LT )ŷ1,q + q != 0. (3.3)
If Υ,q(L˜T ) < 0 then there exists a positive number ŷ
,q > L˜T satisfying Υ
,q(ŷ,q) = 0,
i.e.,
U(ŷ
,q)− ŷ,qU ′(ŷ,q) + q != 0. (3.4)
In fact, ŷ1,q is the tangency point of the straight line starting from the point (0,−q)
to the curve U(x − LT ) in the first case and ŷ,q is the tangency point of the straight
line starting from (0,−q) to the curve U(x) in the second case.
Proof. We prove the first property. To this end, note that the left hand side of (3.3)
is an increasing, continuous function in ŷ1,q due to the concavity of U . By Inada’s
condition, it takes values in (−∞,Υ1,q(L˜T )] and the conclusion follows from the inter-
mediate value theorem. The second statement can be proved in the same way using the
asymptotic elasticity condition of U .
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Below we solve the optimization problem (3.1) using a Lagrangian approach. The
optimal terminal wealth will be expressed as a function of the price density price ξT and
a Lagrangian multiplier λ defined via the budget equality.
3.2 Unregulated optimal wealth for V pL without mortality
In this section, we ignore mortality risk and assume that the equity holder’s payoff
is defined by (2.4). In this context, we take q = 0 in (3.2) and  = 0. Then, the
concave hull of the derived utility function U˜ intrinsically depends on how to determine
the tangent line to the curve U˜ starting from the origin. In particular, from Lemma
3.1, if Υ1,0(L˜T ) > 0 the concave hull is linear in [0, ŷ
1,0] and coincides with the curves
U(x−LT ) and U(f(x)) in [ŷ1,0, L˜T ] and in [L˜T ,∞) respectively. In this case, the utility
changing points ŷ1,0 and L˜T play an essential role in the optimal terminal wealth. For
the case that Υ0,0(L˜T ) < 0, the concave hull is linear in [0, ŷ
0,0] and coincides with the
curve U(f(x)) in [ŷ0,0,∞). In this case, only the tangency point ŷ0,0 matters for the
optimal terminal wealth.
Theorem 3.1. The optimal solution to the unconstrained problem (3.1) is given by
Xp,∗T =

h(λξT )1ξT<ξ0
L˜
+ L˜T1ξ0
L˜
≤ξT<ξL̂ + (LT + I(λξT ))1ξL̂≤ξT<ξ̂1,0 if Υ
1,0(L˜T ) > 0,
h(λξT )1ξT<ξ0
L˜
+ L˜T1ξ0
L˜
≤ξT<ξ0U if Υ
0,0(L˜T ) ≥ 0 ≥ Υ1,0(L˜T ),
h(λξT )1ξT<ξ̂0,0 if Υ
0,0(L˜T ) < 0,
where
ξ0
L˜
:=
(1− δ˜)U ′(L̂T )
λ
, ξ0
U
:=
U(L̂T )
L˜Tλ
, ξ̂1,0 :=
U ′(ŷ1,0 − LT )
λ
, ξ̂0,0 :=
(1− δ˜)U ′(f(ŷ0,0))
λ
.
The Lagrangian multiplier λ is defined via the budget constraint E[ξTX
p,∗
T ] = X0.
Proof. See Section A.1.
Let us give some comments on Theorem 3.1. First, when Υ1,0(L˜T ) > 0 or equiva-
lently, the concavification point of U˜ lies on the interval [LT , L˜T ], the optimal terminal
wealth takes a four-region form determined by the utility changing points ŷ1,0 and L˜T .
For Υ0,0(L˜T ) < 0 or equivalently, for the concavification point being in the interval
[L˜T ,∞), the optimal terminal wealth takes a two-region form and is determined by ŷ0,0.
When Υ1,0(L˜T ) ≤ 0 ≤ Υ0,0(L˜T ), concavification is needed on the interval [0, L˜T ]. The
concave hull is then equal to the linear segment connecting zero with L˜T and coincides
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with U(f(x)) on [L˜T ,∞). In this case the optimal terminal wealth takes a three-region
form. In all cases, the optimal terminal wealth ends up with zero from a certain value
of the price density on, i.e., in the worst economic states. This reflects the moral hazard
problem that the insurer does not have an incentive to ensure that there is any capital
in case the terminal wealth falls below the minimal guarantee. The reason is that any
terminal wealth in those loss states only benefits the policyholder and comes at the
expense of a lower terminal wealth in the more prosperous states. We will later see that
introducing a VaR constraint ameliorates this situation.
Optimal policy of wealth distribution: Like the classical concave utility maximiza-
tion problem, the optimal terminal wealth is given as a function of the state price density
ξT at maturity and the Lagrangian multiplier which is determined via the budget equa-
tion. In particular, we observe from Theorem 3.1 that for Υ1,0(L˜T ) > 0, the four-region
form solution is characterised by wealth levels defined by [h(λξT ), L˜T , LT + I(λξT ), 0]
corresponding to the partition of the terminal market states with boundary points
[ξ0
L˜
, ξL̂, ξ̂
1,0]. In other words, the wealth level at time T is respectively assigned to
h(λξT ) on the sub-interval (0, ξ
0
L˜
), to L˜T on [ξ
0
L˜
, ξL̂), to LT + I(λξT ) on [ξL̂, ξ̂
1,0) and
finally to zero on [ξ̂1,0,∞). Therefore, it is convenient to represent the terminal wealth
in dependence of the state price as
[h,L˜,I+L,0]
W
[ξ0
L˜
,ξ
L̂
,ξ̂1,0]
(λ, ξT ) := h(λξT )1ξT<ξ0
L˜
+ L˜T1ξ0
L˜
≤ξT<ξL̂ + (LT + I(λξT ))1ξL̂≤ξT<ξ̂1,0 .
For simplicity, below we drop the dependence of the terminal wealth on the Lagrangian
multiplier and the price density. In the same spirit as above, the optimal wealth for the
case Υ1,0(L˜T ) ≤ 0 ≤ Υ0,0(L˜T ) and the case Υ0,0(L˜T ) < 0 can be respectively represented
by the three-region and the two-region wealth distributions as
[h,L˜,0]
W
[ξ0
L˜
,ξ0
U
]
:= h(λξT )1ξT<ξ0
L˜
+ L˜T1ξ0
L˜
≤ξT<ξ0U and
[h,0]
W
[ξ̂0,0]
:= h(λξT )1ξT<ξ̂0,0 .
These representations of wealth distribution will be used in the rest of the paper for
notational convenience.
Remark 3. Concavification is not needed for the case where U(0) = −∞. In this
situation, it can be deduced directly from the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Appendix A.1 that
the optimal terminal wealth is given by
h(λξT )1ξT<ξ0
L˜
+ L˜T1ξ0
L˜
≤ξT<ξL̂ + (LT + I(λξT ))1ξL̂≤ξT =
[h,L˜,I+L]
W
[ξ0
L˜
,ξ
L̂
]
(λ, ξT ).
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3.3 Full protection and S-shaped utility functions without mor-
tality
We now turn our attention to the case where the policyholder receives a full protection
as discussed in Section 2.3 without mortality (i.e.,  = 0). Noting that the insurer’s
payoff may take negative values, we consider the following unconstrained optimization
problem with an S-shaped utility function US
sup
XT∈X
E
[
U˜S,np(XT )
]
, where U˜S,np := US ◦ V npE . (3.5)
We assume that U˜S,np is convex on [0, LT ] and piecewise concave on each interval [LT , L˜T ]
and [L˜T ,∞). Losses are bounded by Ulo(LT ). The concave hull of the derived utility
function U˜S is characterized by Lemma 3.1 which determines the tangent line to the
curve U˜S starting from the (0,−Ulo(L)) with q = ql := Ulo(LT ) in this context.
Remark 4. We observe that for any x ≥ L˜T , Υ1,ql(x) > Υ1,0(x), which implies that
ŷ1,ql < ŷ1,0 whenever they both exist. Similarly, ŷ0,ql < ŷ0,0 whenever they both exist.
This means that the concavification area for the full protection case using an S-shaped
utility function will be reduced in comparison to the case of a defaultable contract, as-
suming that the insurer uses the same concave utility function U for the gain part.
Having discussed the concave hull of the S-shaped utility function we are in a position
to present the optimal solution to problem (3.5).
Theorem 3.2. The optimal solution to the S-shaped utility unconstrained problem (3.5)
is given by
Xnp,∗T =
[h,L˜,I+L,0]
W
[ξ0
L˜
,ξ
L̂
,ξ̂1,ql ]
1Υ1,ql (L˜T )>0 +
[h,L˜,0]
W
[ξ0
L˜
,ξ
ql
U ]
1Υ0,ql (L˜T )≥0≥Υ1,ql (L˜T ) +
[h,0]
W
[ξ̂0,ql ]
1Υ0,ql (L˜T )<0,
where
ξql
U
:=
U(L̂T ) + Ulo(LT )
L˜Tλ
, ξ̂1,ql :=
U ′(ŷ1,ql − LT )
λ
and ξ̂0,ql := (1− δ˜)U
′(f(ŷ0,ql))
λ
.
The Lagrangian multiplier λ is defined via the budget constraint E[ξTX
np,∗
T ] = X0.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
We observe from Theorem 3.2 that the optimal terminal wealth takes an all-or-
nothing form. Hence, giving a full protection to the policyholder, the insurance company
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needs to take the possibility of having negative terminal wealth into account. In line
with descriptive decision theory, we assume a convex utility function for the loss area
[0, LT ]. As numerically shown in Figure 6, the insurer is induced to take a more prudent
investment strategy. Mathematically, this follows from ŷ1,ql < ŷ1,0 and ŷ0,ql < ŷ0,0
provided they exist, see Remark 4. Now, using the budget constraint we conclude that
the Lagrangian multiplier of the S-shaped utility problem is greater than the one in
the case with a default put. This means that an S-shaped utility function leads to a
shift-to-the-right effect on the optimal terminal wealth.
Remark 5. We observe that for α = 0 (i.e., the policyholder has no initial contribution)
with a defaultable contract, the problem becomes simpler with a call-option-form payoff
(XT − LT )+. When α = 1 (i.e., the policyholder fully contributes to the investment
pool), the insurer’s payoff also takes a call-option-form payoff (1 − δ)(XT − LT )+. As
numerically illustrated in Figure 4, these cases lead to a riskier investment, see more
in [13]. For a fully protected contract it can also be observed that the insurer’s payoff
is given by XT − LT if α = 0 and (1 − δ)(XT − LT ) for XT > LT and XT − LT for
XT < LT when α = 1. Note that these situations are not interesting in practice as the
contract would in each case not be acceptable to one of the two respective sides.
3.4 The optimal strategy
We have determined the optimal terminal wealth as a function of ξT and a multiplier λ
that satisfies the budget constraint. For the reader’s convenience, we briefly discuss how
to deduce the optimal strategy by applying the martingale representation theorem. Let
Z = X(λ, ξT ) be the optimal terminal wealth and define Zt := ξ
−1
t E[ξTZ|Ft]. Then, the
process (ξtZt)t∈[0,T ] is a martingale under P. Therefore, by the martingale representation
theorem, there exists a square integrable adapted process (ςt) such that
ξtZt = X0 +
∫ t
0
ςsdWs, t ∈ [0, T ],
or equivalently, d(ξtZt) = ςtdWt. On the other hand, applying Itoˆ’s lemma we get
dZt = d(ξtZtξ
−1
t ) = ξ
−1
t d(ξtZt) + ξtZtdξ
−1
t + d(ξtZt)dξ
−1
t
= (ξ−1t ςt + Ztθt)dWt +
(
(rt + θ
2
t )Zt + ξ
−1
t ςtθt
)
dt.
Identifying the last equation with (2.3) we deduce that the optimal strategy pi∗t is given
by
pi∗t = σ
−1
t ξ
−1
t ςt + σ
−1
t Ztθt, X
∗
t = Zt.
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Note that pi∗t = σ
−1
t ξ
−1
t ςt + σ
−1
t Ztθt is square integrable and is hence admissible.
The same argument can be applied for the constrained problems below. More explicit
representations can be provided for power and logarithmic utility functions.
4 Optimal wealth with mortality risk
We now consider Problem (2.8) with mortality, i.e.,  > 0. Recall that for both payoffs,
the derived utility function U˜S,j, defined in (2.10) takes an S-shaped form. The concave
hull of the derived utility function U˜S,j,(x), related to the existence of a tangency line
starting from (0,−qj), is now characterized by Lemma 3.1 with q = qj, j ∈ {p, np}
being defined in (2.15). The optimal terminal wealth of problem (2.9) is characterised
by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. For any  ∈ [0, 1), the optimal terminal wealth of Problem (2.9) is given
by
Xj,,∗T =
[I,L˜,I+L,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
L̂
,ξ̂1,qj ]
1Υ1,qj (L˜T )>0+
[I,L˜,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
qj
U ]
1Υ,qj (L˜T )≥0≥Υ1,qj (L˜T )+
[I,0]
W
[ξ̂,qj ]
1Υ,qj (L˜T )<0, j ∈ {p, np},
where
ξ̂,q :=
U ′(ŷ
,q)
λ
, ξ
L˜
:=
U ′

(L˜T )
λ
, ξq
U
:=
U(L̂T ) + q
L˜Tλ
and ξL̂ :=
U ′(L̂T )
λ
. (4.1)
The Lagrangian multiplier λ is defined via the budget constraint.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
We remark that the no-mortality case  = 0 is already given in Theorem 3.2. Let
us now consider the case where  = 1, i.e., the policyholder dies almost surely before
the maturity of the contract. In this case, assuming that the insurer uses an S-shaped
utility function
US,0(XT ) :=
−Ulo(LT −XT ) if XT ≤ LT ,U(XT − LT ) if LT < XT ,
we obtain the following optimal solution.
Corollary 4.1. Suppose that  = 1. The optimal terminal wealth (with and without
default put) is given by W[LT+I,0][ξ̂1,qnp ] , where λ satisfies the budget constraint.
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5 Optimal investment under regulations
5.1 The VaR-constrained problem
As seen in the previous section, under the absence of regulation the equity holder will
optimally choose a strategy which may lead to insolvency at maturity. In this case,
the policyholder suffers severe losses since the terminal portfolio value may be zero
for very bad market scenarios. In practice, an appropriate investment must take some
regulatory constraints into account. According to Solvency II, the insurance company
needs to ensure that a VaR-type regulation (i.e., a default probability constraint) shall
be satisfied. In addition, the insurance company is interested in achieving at least a
target payment to serve the promised guaranteed amount to the policyholder. Therefore,
the equity holder (the insurance company) has to choose an optimal dynamic portfolio
under a VaR constraint, which can be stated as
sup
XT∈X
E
[
U˜S,j,(XT )
]
, s.t. P(XT < LT ) < β, j ∈ {p, np}, (5.1)
for some probability default level 0 ≤ β < 1. It is clear that the introduction of
a probabilistic constraint complicates the non-concave problem. In the spirit of the
Lagrange method, it is natural to consider the following auxiliary utility function
U˜S,j,λ2 (x) := U˜
S,j,
λ2
(x)− λ21x<LT ,
where λ2 ≥ 0 is a multiplier. Problem (5.1) boils down to maximize E[U˜ jλ2(XT )] over the
set X . However, it is not clear at first sight how to link the optimality of the auxiliary
utility function U˜λ2 with the optimality of the initial utility function U˜ under the VaR
constraint as U˜λ2 depends on λ2, and different λ2 will lead to different optimal solutions.
However, a good choice for λ2 should reflect the bindingness of VaR constraint. Below
we show that this goal can be achieved using a special form of λ2 which follows from a
careful comparison of the local maximizers in the unconstrained problem.
Theorem 5.1. Let β ∈ (0, 1) and define ξ¯ so that P(ξT > ξ¯) = β. Suppose that
X0 ≥ E[ξTLT1ξT≤ξ¯]. Then, the VaR-constrained problem (5.1), j ∈ {p, np}, admits the
following optimal solution:
• If Υ1,qj(L˜T ) > 0 then
XV aR,j,,∗T =
[I,L˜,I+L,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
L̂
,ξ¯]
1ξ¯≥ξ̂1,qj +
[I,L˜,I+L,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
L̂
,ξ̂1,qj ]
1ξ¯<ξ̂1,qj .
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• If Υ,qj(L˜T ) ≥ 0 ≥ Υ1,qj(L˜T ) then
XV aR,j,,∗T =
[I,L˜,I+L,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
L̂
,ξ¯]
1ξ¯≥ξ
L̂
+
[I,L˜,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ¯]
1
ξ
qj
U ≤ξ¯<ξL̂
+
[I,L˜,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
qj
U ]
1
ξ¯<ξ
qj
U
.
• If Υ,qj(L˜T ) < 0 then
XV aR,j,,∗T =
[I,L˜,I+L,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
L̂
,ξ¯]
1ξ¯≥ξ
L̂
+
[I,L˜,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ¯]
1ξ
L˜
≤ξ¯<ξ
L̂
+
[I,0]
W
[ξ¯]
1ξ̂,qj≤ξ¯<ξ
L˜
+
[I,0]
W
[ξ̂,qj ]
1ξ¯<ξ̂,qj .
In each case, the Lagrangian multiplier λ is defined via the budget constraint.
Proof. See Section A.3.
We observe first that when ξ¯ < ξ̂1,qj/ξ¯ < ξ
qj
U /ξ¯ < ξ̂
,qj in the first/second/third case,
the VaR constrained is not binding and the corresponding unconstrained solution Xj,,∗T
given by (4.1) is still optimal for (5.1). On the other hand, when the VaR constraint
is binding (active) the terminal wealth will be (partially) shifted to the right of the
concavification point and we can observe that for j ∈ {n, np}, there exists ξ∗j > 0 such
that
XV aR,j,,∗T (ξT ) ≥ Xj,,∗T (ξT ) for all ξT ≥ ξ∗j ,
meaning that the VaR-terminal wealth dominates the unconstrained terminal wealth
for the most negative loss states (due to the fact that XV aR,j,,∗T (ξT ) and X
j,,∗
T (ξT ) are
decreasing in ξT ). Hence, introducing a VaR-constraint, forces the equity holders to
enlarge the proportion of hedged loss states, leading to a genuine improvement for the
policyholders. This result is contrary to the situation where the insurer maximizes
the utility of the total wealth of the company without distinguishing between equity
holders and policyholders, in which case a VaR constraint may induce the insurer to
take excessive risk leading to higher losses than in the case of no-regulation, see [3].
However, there is still a region of market scenarios in which the optimal terminal wealth
equals zero, which means that a VaR regulation does not lead to a full prevention of
moral hazard. The intuitive reason is that under a VaR regulation, the equity holder
is only required to keep the portfolio value above LT with a given probability 1 − β.
Once the regulation is probabilistically fulfilled the equity holder can push the remaining
risk into the tail to seek a higher potential wealth level in good market states. This
is consistent with the classical VaR-constrained asset allocation problem with concave
utility functions [3]. However, in our case with participating contracts, the use of a VaR
constraint does not lead the insurance company to bigger losses than in the case of no
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regulations as in the classical VaR problem. On the contrary, our results show that for
an insurance company with equity holders, a VaR constraint strictly improves the risk
management for the loss states.
5.2 The PI-constrained problem
In this section, we try to better protect the policyholder from the equity holder’s gam-
bling investment strategies by, instead of having a VaR constraint, assuming that the
equity holder has to keep the portfolio value almost surely above some given level min-
imum capital requirement l. Hence the insurance company needs to solve
sup
XT∈X
E
[
U˜S,j,(XT )
]
, s.t. XT ≥ l a.s., j ∈ {p, np}. (5.2)
For simplicity we assume that l is deterministic.
Let us first consider the case 0 ≤ l ≤ LT . As before, concavification is characterized
by the following generalized version of Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 5.1 (Tangency point for PI-problem). Let  ∈ [0, 1], q ≥ 0 and Υ,ql be defined
by
Υ,ql (x) := U(x)− U ′(x)(x− l) + q.
If Υ1,ql (L˜T ) > 0 then there exists a positive number LT < ŷ
1,q
l < L˜T satisfying Υ
1,q
l (ŷ
1,q
l ) =
0, i.e.,
U(ŷ1,ql − LT )− U ′(ŷ1,ql − LT )(ŷ1,ql − l) + q != 0.
If Υ,ql (L˜T ) < 0 then there exists a positive number ŷ
,q
l > L˜T satisfying Υ
,q
l (ŷ
,q
l ) = 0,
i.e.,
U(ŷ
,q
l )− U ′(ŷ,ql )(ŷ,ql − l) + q != 0.
As before, ŷ1,ql is the tangency point of the straight line starting from the point
(l,−q) to the curve U(x − LT ) in the first case, and ŷ,ql is the tangency point of the
straight line starting from (l,−q) to the curve U(x) in the second case.
We remark that to hedge against the minimum capital level l, the investor must start
with at least E[ξT l]. Next, we show in Theorem 5.2 that the optimal terminal wealth
under the PI constraint takes a similar form as in the unconstrained case but with
bounded losses. Gambling investment behavior is prevented thanks to the additional
guarantee l.
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Theorem 5.2. Assume that 0 ≤ l < LT and X0 ≥ E[ξT l] = le−rT . Then, the optimal
solution to the insurance portfolio problem (5.2) is given by
XPI,j,,∗T =
[I,L˜,I+L,l]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
L̂
,ξ̂
1,qj
l ]
1
Υ
1,qj
l (L˜T )>0
+
[I,L˜,l]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
qj
U,l]
1
Υ
,qj
l (L˜T )≥0≥Υ
1,qj
l (L˜T )
+
[I,l]
W
[ξ̂
,qj
l ]
1
Υ
,qj
l (L˜T )<0
, j ∈ {p, np},
where, as in (4.1),
ξ̂,ql = U
′
(ŷ
,q
l )/λ and ξ
q
U,l
:=
U(L̂T )
(L˜− l)λ. (5.3)
The Lagrangian multiplier λ is defined via the budget constraint E[ξTX
PI,j,,∗
T ] = X0.
Proof. See Section A.2.
In this theorem the moral hazard problem shown in Theorem 3.1 is resolved by intro-
ducing a minimal bound. However, this comes at the expense of lowering significantly
the wealth in the prosperous states and is thus rather costly, see the numerical analyzes
below.
Let us now turn to the case where the minimum amount lies between the utility
changing points LT ≤ l < L˜T (i.e., between the guarantee and the bonus threshold). In
this case, the derived utility function U˜S,j, is strictly increasing and globally concave in
the considered domain [l,∞). However, U˜S,j, is not smooth at L˜T since limx↘L˜T U ′(x) =
((1− )(1− δ˜) + )U ′(L̂T ) < limx↗L˜T U ′(x) = U ′(L̂T ), which makes the classical utility
maximization result inapplicable. We remark that concavification is not needed because
we have global concavity in the optimization domain. The case l ≥ L˜T is just the
classical portfolio insurance problem with concave utility function U and can be dealt
with similarly. The following result can be directly obtained using the same Lagrangian
technique.
Proposition 5.1. Assume that X0 ≥ E[ξT l] = le−rT . Then, for LT < l < L˜T , the
optimal solution to the insurance portfolio problem (5.2) is given by
[I,L˜,I+L,l]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
L̂
,ξ
l̂
]
= I(λξT )1ξT<ξ
L˜
+ L˜T1ξ
L˜
≤ξT<ξL̂ + (LT + I(λξT ))1ξL̂≤ξT<ξl̂ + l1ξT≥ξl̂ ,
where ξl̂ := U
′(l − LT )/λ. When l = LT the optimal terminal wealth is
[I,L˜,I+L]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
L̂
]
= I(λξT )1ξT<ξ
L˜
+ L˜T1ξ
L˜
≤ξT<ξL̂ + (LT + I(λξT ))1ξL̂≤ξT ,
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(b) Fully protected contract with η = 1.01.
Figure 3: Unconstrained optimal terminal wealth with δ = 0.6.
which can be seen the limiting case by sending ξl̂ in (5.4) to infinity. For L˜T ≤ l,
the optimal terminal wealth is given by W[I,l][ξ
l
]
= I(λξT )1ξT<ξl
+ l1ξT≥ξl , where ξ

l
:=
U ′(l)/λ. The Lagrangian multiplier λ satisfies the budget constraint.
6 Numerical examples
We assume that the equity holder’s utility function is given by U(x) := x1−γ/(1−γ) with
γ = 0.5. For the full protection case, we assume that Ulo(x) = ηU(−x). The market
coefficients are µ = 0.05; r = 0.03;σ = 0.3. The contract has a maturity T = 10 and
the total contribution (i.e., the initial capital) is fixed with X0 = 100. The guarantee
is given by LT = 50e
gT , where the guarantee interest rate is g = 0.02. Below we
look at the investment behavior of the reference portfolio decided by the insurer in
order to maximize his expected terminal utility with and without regulations. Note
that constant proportion portfolio insurance (CPPI) strategies can be considered as a
possible benchmark for comparative analysis, see [29]. We emphasize that the CPPI
strategies are not optimal and provide less expected utility for the insurer. For an
analytic discussion, it may be useful to compare the insurer’s strategy with the Merton
strategy which maximizes the insurer’s utility of the total wealth of the company without
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distinguishing between equity and policyholders starting with the same total initial
endowment.
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Figure 4: Defaultable contract: effect of α and δ on the unconstrained optimal strategies at
t = 8.
Figure 3 plots the optimal terminal portfolio with different values of α for the case
with a defaultable contract and with a fully protected contract. It can be observed that
the optimal terminal wealth can take a two-, three- or four-region form as also shown
in Theorem 3.1. The first thing to note from the graph is that in both cases (with a
defaultable or a fully protected contract) there is no monotonicity in α. Instead, in
particular for defaultable contracts, the insurer is most risk seeking for very small and
very large values of α which can be seen by the fact that these values in good states
(i.e., for small values of ξT ) yield a relatively high terminal wealth while in bad states
the terminal wealth is lower, and the unhedged region where the terminal wealth is zero
increases. The reason might be that as will be seen below a very high participation rate
(α ≈ 1) means that the insurer contributes very limitedly in the investment pool which
he tries to make up by taking on more risks in order to mimic a Merton like terminal
wealth in the good states for himself. On the other hand, rather small values of α have
a positive effect on the wealth of the insurer by decreasing his payout obligation. This
wealth effect induces the insurer to become less risk averse, explaining why also low α’s
may come with relatively risky investments. Finally, we remark that for fully protected
contracts the difference between the optimal terminal wealth for different α is minor in
good states. Hence, full protection leads to a harmonization in the gain states of the
investment of companies for different contribution levels of the policyholder.
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Figure 4 depicts the effect of the participating ratio α and the bonus rate δ on the
relationship between the optimal strategy and the wealth level at time t = 8, two years
before maturity. As revealed in the figure, the optimal amount invested in the risky
asset is always non-negative and exhibits a peak-valley structure. The reason for the
peak is that if the wealth becomes low the equity holder is left with nothing or even
with negative wealth and will try push the wealth back “into the money” by investing
heavily into the risky asset. Once the wealth is above the guarantee level the investment
behavior normalizes, i.e., becomes more like the Merton benchmark case. Consistent
with what has been observed in Figure 3, the riskiness increases if the policyholder
contributes very little or very much to the contract. The effect of the bonus rate δ in
the optimal strategy is presented in the right panel of Figure 4, showing that for a given
participation rate the risky investment decreases for low terminal wealth and increases
for a larger terminal wealth if the contract provides the policyholder a higher bonus rate
δ. Again this is due to two effects: the first effect is that with higher bonus rates the
contract becomes less valuable for the equity holder, implicitly lowering his wealth and
shifting the curve to the left. The second effect is that in order to mimic the Merton
strategy for his personal account the insurer needs to actually increase the riskiness of
his position when higher bonus rates go to the policyholder. The graph shows that
the first effect outweighs the second effect in bad economic scenarios while the second
effect is stronger in good economic scenarios where the strategy overall is less sensitive
to shifts in wealth.
The effects of the participation rate α, the bonus rate δ and the loss degree η at
t = 8 for fully protected contracts are illustrated in Figure 5. It can be observed from
the left panel that in line what has been discussed in Figure 4 given a fixed bonus
rate and a loss degree, changing α does not lead to monotone changes in the optimal
strategy. In particular, high and low participation rates may go hand in hand with
relatively risky investments in the loss states. Furthermore, the middle panel shows
that given a participation rate, an increase in δ for fully protected contracts does not
lead to a significant change in the exposure to risk in bad market scenarios. Hence, in
these scenarios the investment of the insurer is rather robust with respect to the bonus
rate and investments seem more motivated by the desire to avoid losses. Moreover, the
higher δ, the closer the strategy to the Merton strategy in case of good performance.
The right panel also shows that increasing the loss aversion η leads the insurer to
more prudent investment strategies in case of bad performance. However, the risky
investment is almost the same in case of good performance. To explain this, we remark
that an increase in η only leads to higher losses while the gain part is not influenced. In
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the case of a fully protected contract, the insurer cares more about losses than gains due
to the convexity of the S-shaped utility function in the loss domain which economically
means that losses hurt more than gains.
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Figure 5: Fully protected contract: effect of the participation rate α, the bonus rate δ and
the loss degree η in the unconstrained strategy at t = 8
Figure 6 shows that potential losses of a fully protected contract lead to a more
prudent behavior compared to the case of a defaultable contract with the same bonus
and participation rates. This numerically confirms the observation in Remark 4.
Let us now compare the unconstrained investment strategy with the constrained
one under a VaR or PI constraint. To serve this aim, the minimum guarantee in the
PI problem and the default probability are chosen as l = 0.2LT and β = 0.025. The
comparison of different strategies is presented in Figure 7 from which we can observe
that the exposure to risk when the wealth process is small (the market condition gets
worse) will be reduced by a VaR constraint. In particular in loss states, Solvency 2 VaR-
type constraints for participating insurance contracts lead to more prudent investment
than investments which are not regulated (i.e., come from unconstrained optimization
problems). This result is contrary to the situation where the insurer maximizes the
utility of the total wealth of the company (without distinguishing between equity holder
and policyholders), in which case a VaR constraint may induce the insurer to take
excessive risk leading to higher losses than in the case of no regulation, see [3]. These
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Figure 6: Unconstrained optimal strategy at t = 8: full protected contract vs defaultable
contracts with δ = 0.6
effects are even more significant if a PI regulation is used. We also obtain similar effects
on the optimal strategies for the full protection case.
7 Conclusion
We solve a utility maximization problem for the equity holder of a participating life
insurance contract under a VaR-type regulatory constraint imposed at maturity. We
obtain a closed-form solution extending the martingale approach to constrained non-
concave utility maximization problems. Our theoretical and numerical results show that
for the case of a defaultable contract, the risk exposure in bad market conditions will be
reduced by a VaR constraint. The prudent investment behavior is more significant if a
VaR-type regulation is replaced by a PI-type regulation. The effects of the parameters
of the contract are also discussed numerically. One interesting extension is to see how
a fair pricing constraint influences the investment behavior of the insurance company.
Another future research direction would be to consider contracts with more general
mortality models.
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Figure 7: Comparing different optimal strategies and optimal terminal wealth for defaultable
contract with δ = 0.6 and α = 0.4.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1 (the unconstrained case)
This section is devoted to the detailed proof for the uncontrained problem (2.8). This
problem can be solved by considering the static optimization maxX≥0 Ψ(X) of the La-
grangian
Ψj(X) = U˜
S,j,(X)− λξTX. (A.1)
Below we drop the subscript T for simplicity. Notice that Ψj is not concave, which makes
the problem more challenging to solve. We make use of a modified dual approach which
shows that the global maximal value of Ψj can be attained at the local maximizers or
at the utility changing points L and L˜, or even at the boundary point 0. Note that Ψj
is not differentiable at LT and L˜T . Therefore, it is important to first consider the above
supremum on each interval [0, L], [L, L˜] and [L˜,∞). Then the convex conjugate Ψ∗j can
be obtained from a comparison among these three local maximums. Since Ψj is concave
on each of these intervals the corresponding supremum defines a convex and decreasing
function in λξ. Therefore, Ψ∗j(λξ) can be seen as a decreasing, convex, differentiable
function except at a finite number of points (which are explicitly determined below as
the tangency points depending on our parameters). Convex analysis ensures that the
double conjugate Ψ∗∗j is the smallest concave function which dominates Ψj, and that
on an interval where the concavification is needed Ψ∗∗j is linear. Under smoothness
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condition, the optimal terminal wealth of the problem supX E[Ψ
∗∗
j (X)] is given by the
inverse of marginal utility (Ψ∗∗j
′)−1(λξ), see e.g. [26]. In our setting with piecewise
sharing profit structures, Ψ∗∗j is differentiable except for a finite set consisting of the
utility changing points L, L˜. For this reason, the solution can be determined by a
Lagrangian method. In particular, we will show that the optimal wealth is given by
the right derivative of the first conjugate −(Ψ∗j)′+(λξ) for some Lagrangian multiplier
determined via the budget constraint and we will explicitly calculate it. More discussions
on concavification methods can be found e.g. in [13, 20, 12, 35, 7].
Lemma A.1. For λ > 0 and ξ > 0, the unique solution of the problem maxX≥0 Ψ(X),
for j ∈ {p, np}, is given by
Xj,,∗(λ, ξ) =
[I,L˜,I+L,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
L̂
,ξ̂1,qj ]
1Υ1,qj (L˜T )>0 +
[I,L˜,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
qj
U ]
1Υ,qj (L˜T )≥0≥Υ1,qj (L˜T ) +
[I,0]
W
[ξ̂,qj ]
1Υ,qj (L˜T )<0.
Proof. Note first that we are looking for the global maximizer X∗ of a three-part
function Ψj(X) = Q1(X)1X<L +Q2(X)1L≤X≤L˜ +Q3(X)1X>L˜, for j ∈ {p, np} where
Q1(X) := −jU(L−X)− λξX, Q2(X) := U(X − L)− λξX, Q3(X) := U(X)− λξX.
Clearly, Q1 is strictly linearly decreasing whereas Q2, Q3 are concave functions having
local maximizers X2 := I(λξ) + L and X3 := I(λξ) respectively. Below we denote
Q2,max := maxL≤X≤L˜Q2(X) and Q3,max := maxX>L˜Q3(X) and note that Q1,max =
maxX<LQ1(X) = −jU(L) = −qj. The conclusion follows from a suitable comparison
between the local optimizer X2, X3 with X1 = 0. From (4.1) we observe first that
X2 ∈ [L, L˜] iff ξ ≥ ξL̂ and X3 > L˜ iff ξ < ξL˜. Therefore, we study the Lagrangian on
the following subintervals of values of ξ:
(a) For ξ < ξ
L˜
, we have X2 ≥ L˜ and X3 > L˜ so the Lagrangian Ψj is decreasing from
0 to L and increasing from L to X3 and decreasing again in (X3,∞). So global
optimality can be attained at 0 or X3. To conclude, we consider
Q3,max −Q1,max = U(I(λξ))− λξI(λξ) + qj := ∆a(ξ),
which is a decreasing function in ξ. It follows that Q3,max − Q1,max ≥ ∆a(ξL˜) =
Υ,qj(L˜T ). If Υ
,qj(L˜T ) > 0 then Q3,max − Q1,max > 0 and the global maximizer
is X3. When Υ
,qj(L˜T ) ≤ 0, by Lemma 3.1 there exists ξ̂,qj ≤ ξL˜ such that
∆a(ξ̂
,qj) = 0. In this case, the global maximizer can be chosen as X3 for ξ < ξ̂
,qj
or zero for ξ ∈ [ξ̂,qj , ξ
L˜
).
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(b) For ξ
L˜
≤ ξ < ξL̂, X2 ≥ L˜ but X3 ≤ L˜ so the Lagrangian is decreasing from 0 to L
and increasing from L to L˜ and decreasing again in (L˜,∞). So global optimality
can be attained at 0 or L˜. To conclude, we consider Q2,max−Q1,max = Q2(L˜)+qj =
U(L˜−L)− λξL˜+ qj := ∆b(ξ), which is a decreasing function in ξ. It follows that
∆b(ξ) ∈ (Υ1,qj(L˜T ),Υ,qj(L˜T )]. If Υ1,qj(L˜T ) > 0 then ∆b(ξ) > 0 and the global
maximizer is L˜. When Υ,qj(L˜T ) < 0, the global maximizer is zero. It remains
to consider the case Υ1,qj(L˜T ) ≤ 0 ≤ Υ,qj(L˜T ). By Lemma 3.1, ∆b(ξqjU ) = 0 and
ξ
L˜
≤ ξqjU < ξL̂. This implies that the global maximizer is L˜ for ξL˜ ≤ ξ < ξ
qj
U or is
equal to zero for ξ
qj
U ≤ ξ < ξL̂.
(c) For ξ ≥ ξL̂, X2 ≤ L˜ and X3 < L˜ so the Lagrangian is decreasing from 0 to L and
increasing from L to X2 and decreasing again in (X2,∞). So global optimality
can be attained at 0 or X2. We need to study Q2,max − Q1,max = Q2(X2) − qj =
U(I(λξ))−λξ(I(λξ)+L)+qj := ∆c(ξ), which is a decreasing function in ξ. Thus,
∆c(ξ) ≤ ∆c(ξL̂) = Υ1,qj(L˜T ). Therefore, zero is the maximizer if Υ1,qj(L˜T ) ≤ 0.
Suppose now that Υ1,qj(L˜T ) > 0. By Lemma 3.1, there exists ξ̂
1,qj > ξL̂ such that
∆c(ξ̂
1,qj) = 0 and the global optimality is attained at X2 for ξ̂
1,qj > ξ ≥ ξL̂ and at
zero for ξ ≥ ξ̂1,qj , respectively.
Note that ∆a(ξ̂
,qj) = 0 is equivalent to (3.4) with ŷ,qj = I(λξ̂
,qj), whereas ∆c(ξ̂
1,qj) = 0
is equivalent to (3.3) with ŷ1,qj = I(λξ̂1,qj) + L.
Remark 6. From the analysis above it follows that Xj,,∗(λ, ξ) = −(Ψ∗j)′+(λξ).
We now prove Theorem 4.1 and then Theorem 3.1. Let us prove that Xj,,∗(λ, ξT )
defined by (3.1) is the solution to (3.1). For any terminal wealth XT ≥ 0 satisfying the
budget constraint we have
E[U˜S,j,(XT ))] ≤ E[U˜S,j,(XT )) + λ(X0 − ξTXT )] (A.2)
≤ E
[
sup
X≥0
(U˜S,j,(X)− λξTX)
]
+X0λ
= E[U˜S,j,(Xj,,∗(λ, ξT ))] + λ(X0 − E[ξTXj,,∗(λ, ξT )])
= E[U˜S,j,(Xj,,∗(λ, ξT ))].
The last equality folows from E[ξTX
j,,∗(λ, ξT )] = X0. Hence, Xj,,∗ is optimal. The
existence of the Lagrangian multiplier λ follows from the lemma below.
Lemma A.2. For any λ ∈ (0,∞), we have
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1. E[U(I(λξT ))] <∞ =⇒ E[U˜S,j,(Xj,,∗(λ, ξT ))] <∞;
2. E[ξT I(λξT )] <∞ =⇒ E[ξTXj,,∗(λ, ξT )] <∞;
3. Furthermore, if E[ξT I(λξT )] < ∞ for any λ ∈ (0,∞), the mapping ψ : λ 7−→
E[ξTX
j,,∗(λ, ξT )] is strictly decreasing, continuous and surjective from (0,∞) to
(0,∞).
Proof. The first two conclusions follow from the observation that
Xj,,∗(λ, ξT ) ≤ L˜T + (1− δ˜)−1I(λ˜ξT ), with λ˜ := [(1− δ˜)(1− ) + ]−1λ,
using (2.13). For the last one, it suffices to notice that I is strictly decreasing, so for
a.s. all ω ∈ Ω, λ 7−→ Xj,,∗(λ, ξT (ω)) is strictly decreasing, which implies that ψ is also
decreasing. Now, if E[ξT I(λξT )] < ∞ then ψ is well defined. Noting that the price
density ξT has no atom, (i.e., for all a ∈ R, P(ξT = a) = 0), we deduce that ψ is
continuous on (0,∞). Moreover, for a.s. all ω we have limλ→0Xj,,∗(λ, ξT (ω)) =∞ and
limλ→∞X
j,,∗(λ, ξT (ω)) = 0 due to the Inada condition and the monotone convergence
theorem, which implies that ψ is surjective.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2 (the PI-constraint case)
The proof follows from a modification of Lemma A.1. In fact, due to the PI constraint,
the problem boils down to consider the global optimality on the interval [l,∞) of Ψj(X)
defined in (A.1).
Lemma A.3. For λ > 0 and ξ > 0, the problem maxX≥l Ψ(X), for j ∈ {p, np}, has the
solution
XPI,j,,∗ =
[I,L˜,I+L,l]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
L̂
,ξ̂
1,qj
l ]
1
Υ
1,qj
l >0
+
[I,L˜,l]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
qj
U,l]
1
Υ
,qj
l ≥0≥Υ
1,qj
l
+
[I,l]
W
[ξ̂
,qj
l ]
1
Υ
,qj
l <0
, j ∈ {p, np}.
Proof. Global optimality on [l,∞) of Ψj can be attained at X1 = l, X2 = L + I(λξ),
X3 = h(λξ) or at the utility changing point L˜. In particular, we need to consider
the optimality of Q1(X) on the interval [l, L]. Thus, Q1,max = −qj − λξl but Q2,max
and Q3,max remain unchanged. As a result, the analysis needs to be modified when we
compare the local maximizers X2 = L + I(λξ), X3 = I(λξ) and L˜ to X1 = l. For
example, for the comparison between X3 and X1 = l, we study the difference
Q3,max −Q1,max = ∆a(ξ) + λξl = U(f(h(λξ)))− λξh(λξ) + λξl + qj := ∆la(ξ).
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In the same way, we also have ∆lb(ξ) := ∆b(ξ) + λξl and ∆
l
c(ξ) := ∆c(ξ) + λξl. Note
that
Υ
1,qj
l (L˜) = ∆
l
b(ξL̂) = ∆
l
c(ξL̂) and Υ
,qj
l (L˜) = ∆
l
b(ξ

L˜
) = ∆la(ξ

L˜
). (A.3)
Furthermore, ξ̂
1,qj
l , ξ̂
,qj
l and ξ
l
U (in case they exist) are zero points of ∆
l
c, ∆
l
a and ∆
l
b
respectively.
The remainder of the proof follows the same lines in Lemma A.1.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 5.1 (the VaR-constrained case)
To study the constrained problem (5.1), we again consider the static optimization of
the Lagrangian
max
X≥0
Ψj(X) := U˜
S,j,(X)− λξX − λ21X<L, (A.4)
for given λ > 0, λ2 ≥ 0. Again, the subscript T is dropped for simplicity. Note first
that Ψj is not concave and Problem (A.4) is more challenging than the unconstrained
case due to the presence of the additional indicator function. Below, we show that the
optimality can be obtained within a modified dual approach.
The key point is to choose the second multiplier λ2 as a function of the first one. This
is because we need to check the “bindingness” of the VaR constraint by comparing the
unconstrained solution with the VaR-threshold LT . Let ξ¯ be defined by P(ξT > ξ¯) = β.
From Theorem 3.1 we observe that
P(Xj,,∗ < LT ) =

P(ξT > ξ̂
1,qj) if Υ1,qj(L˜T ) > 0,
P(ξT > ξ
qj
U ) if Υ
,qj(L˜T ) ≥ 0 ≥ Υ1,qj(L˜T ),
P (ξT > ξ̂
1,qj
δ ) if Υ
,qj(L˜T ) < 0,
(A.5)
for j ∈ {p, np}. Therefore, to incorporate the bindingness of the VaR constraint, λ2
should be chosen such that it is zero when the above probability is smaller than the
insolvency level β. For example, if Υ1,qj(L˜T ) > 0 then λ2 > 0 if ξ̂
1,qj < ξ and λ2 = 0 if
ξ̂1,qj ≥ ξ. The other cases can be seen similarly. On the other hand, λ2 needs to reflect
the corresponding comparison of local maxima in the proof of Lemma A.1. Then, a
closer inspection suggests defining
λ2 =

−∆c(ξ)1ξ̂1,qj<ξ, if Υ1,qj(L˜T ) > 0,
−∆b(ξ)1ξqjU <ξ≤ξL̂ −∆c(ξ)1ξ≥ξL̂ , if Υ
,qj(L˜T )) ≥ 0 ≥ Υ1,qj(L˜T ),
−∆a(ξ)1ξ̂1,qj<ξ≤ξ
L˜
−∆b(ξ)1ξ
L˜
<ξ≤ξ
L̂
−∆c(ξ)1ξ
L̂
<ξ, if Υ
,qj(L˜T ) < 0.
(A.6)
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Lemma A.4. For λ > 0 and ξ > 0, the unique solution XV aR,j,,∗(λ, ξ) := argmax
X≥0Ψj(X)
is given by:
• If Υ1,qj(L˜T ) > 0 then
XV aR,j,,∗T =
[I,L˜,I+L,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
L̂
,ξ¯]
1ξ¯≥ξ̂1,qj +
[I,L˜,I+L,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
L̂
,ξ̂1,qj ]
1ξ¯<ξ̂1,qj .
• If Υ,qj(L˜T ) ≥ 0 ≥ Υ1,qj(L˜T ) then
XV aR,j,,∗T =
[I,L˜,I+L,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
L̂
,ξ¯]
1ξ¯≥ξ
L̂
+
[I,L˜,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ¯]
1
ξ
qj
U ≤ξ¯<ξL̂
+
[I,L˜,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
qj
U ]
1
ξ¯<ξ
qj
U
.
• If Υ,qj(L˜T ) < 0 then
XV aR,j,,∗T =
[I,L˜,I+L,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ
L̂
,ξ¯]
1ξ¯≥ξ
L̂
+
[I,L˜,0]
W
[ξ
L˜
,ξ¯]
1ξ
L˜
≤ξ¯<ξ
L̂
+
[I,0]
W
[ξ¯]
1ξ̂,qj≤ξ¯<ξ
L˜
+
[I,0]
W
[ξ̂,qj ]
1ξ¯<ξ̂,qj .
Proof. We follow the arguments in the proof of Lemma A.1. The only difference is that
Q1(X) := −jU(L−X)−λ2, where λ2 is defined by (A.6). Therefore, Q1,max = −qj−λ2.
Note that Q2 and Q3 remain the same as before. As in (A.3)
Υ1,qj(L˜T ) = ∆b(ξL̂) = ∆c(ξL̂) and Υ
,qj(L˜T ) = ∆b(ξ

L˜
) = ∆a(ξ

L˜
). (A.7)
We consider the following cases:
Case 1: If Υ1,qj(L˜T ) > 0 then λ2 = −∆c(ξ¯)1ξ̂1,qj<ξ. It suffices to suppose that ξ̂1,qj < ξ,
i.e., to consider the case where the VaR constraint is binding.
(a) For ξ < ξ
L˜
, we consider ∆ := Q3,max − Q1,max = ∆a(ξ) + λ2 ≥ ∆a(ξL˜) + λ2 =
Υ,qj(L˜T ) + λ2 > 0. So X3 is the global optimizer of the constrained problem for
ξ < ξ
L˜
.
(b) For ξ
L˜
≤ ξ < ξL̂, global optimality can be attained at 0 or L˜. In this case we have
∆ = Q2,max −Q1,max = ∆b(ξ) + λ2. Because Υ1,qj(L˜T ) > 0 we have ∆b(ξ) > 0 as
in the proof of Lemma A.1 (b) and the global maximizer is L˜.
(c) For ξ ≥ ξL̂, global optimality can be attained at 0 or X2. We need to study
∆ = Q2,max−Q1,max = ∆c(ξ) + λ2 = ∆c(ξ)−∆c(ξ¯). Recall that ∆c is decreasing.
Therefore, ∆ ≥ 0 if ξL̂ ≤ ξ < ξ¯ and the global optimality is attained at X2.
Similarly, ∆ < 0 for ξ ≥ ξ¯, which means that zero is the optimizer.
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Case 2: Suppose Υ,qj(L˜T ) ≥ 0 ≥ Υ1,qj(L˜T ). For ξ < ξL˜, ∆ = Q3,max − Q1,max =
∆a(ξ) + λ2 ≥ Υ,qj(L˜T ) + λ2 > 0 because Υ,qj(L˜T ) > 0 and λ2 > 0 are strictly positive
as in the first case. Hence, X3 is the optimizer.
Assume next that ξ
L˜
≤ ξ < ξL̂. Global optimality can be attained at 0 or L˜.
• Assume that ξqjU ≤ ξ < ξL̂ then λ2 = −∆b(ξ¯). In this case we have ∆ = Q2,max −
Q1,max = ∆b(ξ) − ∆b(ξ¯). As ∆b(ξ) decreases in ξ we conclude that ∆ > 0 for
ξ
L˜
≤ ξ < ξ, which means L˜ is the global maximizer. For ξ ≤ ξ < ξL̂, ∆ < 0 and
optimality is attained at zero.
• If ξ ≥ ξL̂ then λ2 = −∆c(ξ¯). From (A.7), we have ∆ = Q2,max − Q1,max =
∆b(ξ)−∆c(ξ¯) ≥ ∆b(ξ)−∆c(ξL̂) = ∆b(ξ)−∆b(ξL̂) ≥ 0 since ξL˜ ≤ ξ < ξL̂, which
means that optimality is attained at L˜ for ξ
L˜
≤ ξ < ξL̂ .
It remains to consider the case ξ ≥ ξL̂. As before, global optimality can be attained at
0 or X2. We need to study ∆ = Q2,max −Q1,max = ∆c(ξ) + λ2.
• If ξU ≤ ξ < ξL̂ then λ2 = −∆b(ξ¯) which implies that ∆ = ∆c(ξ)−∆b(ξ¯). Observe
that ∆b(ξ¯) ≥ ∆b(ξL̂) = ∆c(ξL̂) since ξ¯ < ξL̂. This leads to ∆ ≤ ∆c(ξ) −∆c(ξL̂).
Because ∆c is decreasing we conclude that ∆ ≤ 0 for ξ ≥ ξL̂, which means that
zero is the optimizer.
• If ξ ≥ ξL̂ then λ2 = −∆c(ξ¯) and ∆ = ∆c(ξ) − ∆c(ξ¯). As ∆ is decreasing, it is
positive for ξL̂ ≤ ξ < ξ¯, hence, X2 is the optimizer, and negative for ξ ≥ ξ¯, which
means that optimality is attained at zero.
Case 3: Suppose Υ,qj(L˜T ) < 0. Let us first consider the case ξ < ξ

L˜
. Again, global
optimality can be attained at 0 or X3. To conclude, we consider ∆ = Q3,max−Q1,max =
∆a(ξ) + λ2.
• If ξ̂1,qjδ ≤ ξ < ξL˜ then λ2 = −∆a(ξ) and hence ∆ = ∆a(ξ)−∆a(ξ). So the global
optimizer is X3 for ξ < ξ¯ and is zero for ξ¯ ≤ ξ < ξL˜.
• If ξ
L˜
≤ ξ < ξL̂ then λ2 = −∆b(ξ) and hence ∆ = ∆a(ξ)−∆b(ξ) ≥ ∆a(ξ)−∆a(ξL˜) ≥
0, which implies that X3 is the global optimizer.
• If ξ ≥ ξL̂ then λ2 = −∆c(ξ) and hence ∆ = ∆a(ξ)−∆c(ξ) ≥ ∆a(ξL˜)−∆c(ξL̂) =
∆b(ξ

L˜
)−∆b(ξL̂) ≥ 0, which implies that X3 is the global optimizer.
Assume now that ξ
L˜
≤ ξ < ξL̂. The global optimality can be attained at 0 or L˜. In
this case we have ∆ = Q2,max −Q1,max = ∆b(ξ) + λ2.
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• If ξ̂1,qjδ ≤ ξ < ξL˜ then λ2 = −∆a(ξ) and hence ∆ = ∆b(ξ) − ∆a(ξ) < ∆b(ξ) −
∆a(ξ

L˜
) = ∆b(ξ)−∆b(ξL˜) < 0. Thus the global optimizer is zero for ξ < ξL˜ ≤ ξ <
ξL̂.
• If ξ
L˜
≤ ξ < ξL̂ then λ2 = −∆b(ξ) and hence ∆ = ∆b(ξ) − ∆b(ξ). The global
optimizer will be L˜ if ξ
L˜
≤ ξ < ξ < ξL̂ and equal to zero if ξ ≤ ξ < ξL̂ .
• If ξ ≥ ξL̂ then λ2 = −∆c(ξ) and hence ∆ = ∆b(ξ) −∆c(ξ) ≥ ∆a(ξL˜) −∆c(ξL̂) =
∆b(ξ

L˜
)−∆b(ξL̂) ≥ 0, which implies that L˜ is the global optimizer.
Next, we assume that ξ ≥ ξL̂. Thus, global optimality can be attained at 0 or X2
depending on the sign of ∆ = Q2,max −Q1,max = ∆c(ξ) + λ2. We consider the following
subcases:
• If ξ̂1,qjδ ≤ ξ < ξL˜ then λ2 = −∆a(ξ) and hence ∆ = ∆c(ξ) − ∆a(ξ) ≤ ∆b(ξL̂) −
∆b(ξ

L˜
) ≤ 0. So the global optimizer is zero.
• If ξ
L˜
≤ ξ < ξL̂ then λ2 = −∆b(ξ) and hence ∆ = ∆c(ξ)−∆b(ξ) ≤ ∆c(ξL̂)−∆b(ξ) =
∆b(ξL̂)−∆b(ξ) ≤ 0, which implies that 0 is the global optimizer.
• If ξ ≥ ξL̂ then λ2 = −∆c(ξ) and hence ∆ = ∆c(ξ)−∆c(ξ), which implies that X2
is the global optimizer in ξL̂ ≤ ξ < ξ, and zero is the optimizer for ξ ≥ ξ.
Thus, the lemma is proved.
Using Lemma A.4, it is straightforward to show that XV aR,j,,∗(λ, ξ) is an optimal
solution to constrained problem (5.1), see the arguments in (A.2). The existence of the
Lagrangian multiplier λ can be seen from Lemma A.2.
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